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[A] direct requirement for most Americans to purchase any product or
service . . . . certainly is an encroachment on individual liberty, but it is
no more so than a command that restaurants or hotels are obliged to
serve all customers regardless of race, that gravely ill individuals
cannot use a substance their doctors described as the only effective
palliative for excruciating pain, or that a farmer cannot grow enough
wheat to support his own family. The right to be free from federal
regulation is not absolute, and yields to the imperative that Congress
be free to forge national solutions to national problems, no matter how
local—or seemingly passive—their individual origins.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)2 requires most lawful
residents of the United States to obtain a certain level of health insurance coverage
(the minimum coverage provision) or pay a certain amount of money each year (the
shared responsibility payment).3 Opponents of these provisions argue, among other
things, that they are beyond the scope of Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce because they regulate inactivity (declining to purchase health insurance),
as opposed to regulating economic activity. One of us has argued elsewhere that the
constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision does not turn on whether
Congress is regulating “inactivity”—that the distinction between inactivity and
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activity does not even partially define the limits of the Commerce Clause.4 Rather, as
identified by the theory of collective action federalism, a better constitutional
distinction is between problems whose solution requires individual action by states
and problems whose solution requires collective action by states.5 This is a
structurally sound way to impose some limits on the commerce power while
justifying the outcomes in the cases cited by Judge Silberman in the quotation that
begins this Article.6
One way a collective action problem arises is when people benefit from
collective action regardless of whether they contribute to it. In the language of social
science, “inactive” individuals who fail to participate in collective action free ride on
the contributions of others to collective action. When the effects of such free riding
spill over state borders, a collective action problem involving individuals causes a
collective action problem involving states.7
Applying this framework, the ACA’s minimum coverage provision is within the
scope of the Commerce Clause, either alone or in combination with the Necessary
and Proper Clause.8 This is because the subject matter it targets is economic in
nature,9 and because it addresses two problems of collective action for the states.10
The first problem is cost-shifting in excess of forty billion dollars per year from the
uninsured to other participants in the healthcare market. The effects of this costshifting spill over state borders.11 The second problem is guaranteeing access to
health insurance while avoiding adverse selection, which occurs when healthy
people delay the purchase of health insurance until they become ill, thereby
undermining the functioning of health insurance markets. Guaranteeing access to
insurance regardless of place of residence in the United States facilitates labor
mobility and discourages the flight of insurance companies from states that
guarantee access to states that do not. Guaranteeing access also dis-incentivizes
states from free riding on the more generous healthcare systems of sister states. In a
regime of guaranteed access, adverse selection severely undermines the functioning
of health insurance markets.12

4
See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and the
Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 LAW & C ONTEMP . PROBS. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 1-8),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1843228.
5
See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN . L. R EV . 115, 135-44 (2010).
6
Judge Silberman was referencing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964), Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
7
See Siegel, supra note 4 (manuscript at 41).
8
For an argument that the minimum coverage provision and shared responsibility payment are
within the scope of the tax power, see generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to
Destroy: A Theory of the Tax Power for a Court that Limits the Commerce Power, 99 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1989537.
9
The Court has held that Congress may regulate only “economic” or “commercial” subject
matter when using its commerce power in cases involving allegedly substantial effects on interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-19 (stressing the economic/non-economic distinction);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-13 (2000) (same); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
559-60 (1995) (same).
10
See generally Siegel, supra note 4.
11
Congress determined that in 2008 alone, the “cost of providing uncompensated care to the
uninsured was $43,000,000,000.” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(F) (2010). Congress further found that “health
care providers pass on the cost to private insurers, which pass on the cost to families. This cost
shifting increases family premiums by on average over $1,000 a year.” Id.
12
See Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 3, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 659 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1057, 11-1058),
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In this Article, we show that these cost-shifting and adverse selection problems
link the federalism dimension of the debate over the ACA to the doctrinally separate
and suppressed individual rights dimension. As the scope of these free-rider
problems justifies federal power to require individuals to obtain health insurance
coverage, so the very existence of the free-rider problems illuminates the difficulty
of arguing directly—as opposed to indirectly through the Commerce Clause—that
the minimum coverage provision infringes individual liberty. The interdependence
between some people’s decisions to forgo insurance and the well-being of other
people means that refusing insurance is far from being a purely self-regarding
action. For reasons rooted in this interdependence, serious obstacles confront anyone
who aims to establish that the liberty claims of free riders should be constitutionally
or morally decisive.
We identify these obstacles to recognition of the claimed liberty interest with
help from law, economics, and philosophy. First, we show that an economic
substantive due process objection to the minimum coverage provision is doctrinally
unavailable. Indeed, its unavailability explains why opponents of the provision take
the less straightforward doctrinal approach of recasting the Commerce Clause in
libertarian terms. Second, we invoke the long-standing tradition of argument in
economics that market failures justify government regulation.
Finally, we draw from the “harm principle” of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.13
Mill’s deep commitment to libertarianism, which reflects the same anti-authoritarian
spirit that moves many libertarians today, does not condemn the minimum coverage
provision. This is because Mill’s criterion categorically forbids only paternalism in
law-making, and the provision is justified on non-paternalistic grounds. When the
regulation under consideration is not paternalistic, Mill’s libertarianism points
explicitly to law and social morality to resolve boundary questions about what
members of a society owe one another. In our judgment, these considerations—from
federal and state safety net programs to charitable hospital practices—weigh in favor
of the permissibility of the minimum coverage provision.
Part II demonstrates that objections to the minimum coverage provision sound
overwhelmingly in individual liberty, not constitutional federalism. Part III
considers libertarian objections to the minimum coverage provision from the
standpoint of legal doctrine. Parts IV and V consider those objections from the
standpoint of political morality. The Conclusion summarizes the argument.
II. THE LIBERTARIAN BASIS OF OBJECTIONS TO THE ACA
As is well-recognized now,14 the language that activists, politicians, and some
judges characteristically employ to express their opposition to the minimum

petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420) (“Without an individual
mandate requirement, more individuals will make the rational economic decision to wait to purchase
coverage until they expect to need health care services. If imposed without an individual mandate
provision, the market reform provisions would reinforce this ‘wait-and-see’ approach by allowing
individuals to move in and out of the market as they expect to need coverage, undermining the very
purpose of insurance to pool and spread risk.”). See generally KENNETH J. ARROW , E SSAYS IN THE
THEORY OF R ISK B EARING (1971).
13
JOHN STUART M ILL, ON LIBERTY 67-175 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ.
Press 2003) (1859).
14
See, e.g., Bryan J. Leitch, Where Law Meets Politics: Freedom of Contract, Federalism, and
the Fight over Health Care, 27 J.L. & POL. 177, 180-81 (2011).
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coverage provision suggests that the primary constitutional concern animating such
opposition is not limitless federal power. The charge, rather, is that the provision
violates individual rights—namely, economic liberty. Even more specifically, the
claim is that the minimum coverage provision violates an individual right to refuse
to purchase insurance. Any right that could substantiate such a claim would sound in
Lochner-style freedom of contract rooted in substantive due process, more precisely
the Lochner Court’s commitment to freedom from any involuntary contract.15
Many examples illustrate this point. Dick Armey and Matt Kibbe of
“Freedomworks” wrote in their aptly entitled book, Give Us Liberty: A Tea Party
Manifesto, that the Tea Party movement was bent on safeguarding “individual
freedoms and economic liberty” because “it is all about the rights of the individual
over the collective.”16 The “Contract from America” unveiled by Tea Party activists
calls for efforts to “[d]efund, repeal and replace the recently passed government-run
health care” as part of a more general appeal for advocacy “on behalf of individual
liberty, limited government, and economic freedom.”17 The concerns expressed in
the Contract regarding limited government concern government at every level—“our
government”—not just the federal government.18
Virginia enacted its opposition to the ACA with a statute entitled the “Virginia
Health Care Freedom Act.”19 The Commonwealth’s Attorney General, Ken
Cuccinelli, asserted that his objection (and legal challenge) to the ACA is “not about
health care” but “about protecting our liberty.”20 Similarly, Attorney General Bill
McCollum of Florida, who took credit for filing the first lawsuit challenging the
minimum coverage provision while running for governor, characterized the states’
lawsuit as defending the “liberty of our citizens.”21 Moreover, forty-nine Republican
members of the United States House of Representatives signed an amicus brief
declaring that “[u]pholding the individual mandate would . . . place Americans’

15
Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Ideology and Counter-Ideology from Lochner to Garcia, 54 U. M O. KAN .
C ITY L. R EV . 175, 187 (1986) (observing that “a private party’s right to refuse to enter into
contractual relations with any person was considered the essence of liberty of contract”).
16
DICK ARMEY & M ATT KIBBE , GIVE US LIBERTY : A TEA PARTY M ANIFESTO 66-68 (2010); see
Dick Armey & Matt Kibbe, Op-Ed., A Tea Party Manifesto, WALL ST . J., Aug. 17, 2010, at A19.
17
THE CONTRACT FROM AMERICA, available at http://www.contractfromamerica.com/thecontract-from-america/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
18
The Contract states:
The purpose of our government is to exercise only those limited powers that have been
relinquished to it by the people, chief among these being the protection of our liberties
by administering justice and ensuring our safety from threats arising inside or outside
our country’s sovereign borders. When our government ventures beyond these functions
and attempts to increase its power over the marketplace and the economic decisions of
individuals, our liberties are diminished and the probability of corruption, internal strife,
economic depression, and poverty increases.
Id.
19
Virginia Health Care Freedom Act, Act of Mar. 10, 2010, ch. 108, 2010 Va. Acts 102 (codified
at VA. C ODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (Supp. 2011)).
20
Jim Nolan, Virginia Argues Against Mandate to Purchase Health Insurance; Judge Promises
to Rule on Constitutionality of U.S. Law by Year’s End, R ICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH , Oct. 19, 2010,
at A-1.
21
Bill McCollum, Commentary, Defending Floridians Against Unlawful Mandate, TAMPA TRIB .
(Aug. 8, 2010), http://www2.tbo.com/news/opinion/2010/aug/08/co-defending-floridians-againstunlawful-mandate-ar-41488/.
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economic liberty at risk.”22 Tellingly, Mitt Romney is having a very difficult time
persuading political conservatives that his support for healthcare reform in
Massachusetts is reconcilable with his opposition to the ACA.23 Romney’s
opposition to the ACA on grounds of constitutional federalism, not individual
liberty, is going nowhere in Republican politics even as Republican politicians and
conservative political forces litigate their opposition to the ACA in Romney’s
terms.24
Turning to the judiciary, one federal district court that invalidated the minimum
coverage provision ostensibly on federalism grounds nonetheless asserted towards
the end of its opinion that “[a]t its core, this dispute is not simply about regulating
the business of insurance—or crafting a scheme of universal health insurance
coverage—it’s about an individual’s right to choose to participate.”25 Another
federal district court that invalidated the minimum coverage provision appeared
explicitly and provocatively to adopt Tea Party rhetoric. “It is difficult to imagine,”
he wrote, “that a nation which began, at least in part, as the result of opposition to a
British mandate giving the East India Company a monopoly and imposing a nominal
tax on all tea sold in America would have set out to create a government with the
power to force people to buy tea in the first place.”26 In the contemporary American
constitutional order, appeals to freedom, liberty, rights, choice, and non-coercion
share a logic. It is the logic of individual rights, not the logic of limits on federal
power.27 On that logic, the foregoing liberty-based objections to the ACA ought to

22
Amici Curiae Brief of the American Center for Law & Justice et al. in Support of
Plaintiffs/Appellees at 22, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 659 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos.
11-1057, 11-1058), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420).
23
See Jim Rutenberg, Romney Defends Massachusetts Health Plan, but Concedes Flaws, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A20. Rutenberg reports:
But his embrace of the mandate—a policy some Republicans once had favored but
nearly all now reject as unwarranted incursion by the government into personal
decisions and private markets—seemed to trump his larger states’ rights argument for
some conservatives. “He was for it when he was governor and now it’s clearly
something that the broad coalition of conservatives feels is not a good idea at the
national level or at the state level,” said James C. Capretta, an associate director of
health care policy at the Office of Management and Budget during Mr. Bush’s first term
and now a fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center.
Id.
24
Romney’s status as Republican front-runner for the presidency does not detract from the point
in the text. Most likely, he has achieved that status despite his past support for an individual mandate
on the state level, not because of it.
25
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010) (emphasis
added), vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept.
30, 2011) (No. 11-420).
26
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1286 (N.D.
Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235
(11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011)
(mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and
cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012). This appeal
overlooks the historically critical distinction between taxation without representation and taxation (or
regulation) with representation.
27
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Obama’s Constitution: The Passive Virtues Writ Large, 26
C ONST . C OMMENT. 183, 191 (2010) (stating that “the Commerce Clause argument mistakenly cast the
autonomy issue as a federalism issue when it is in fact one about individual entitlements against
government, which should be as powerful against state action as against federal action”); Leitch,
supra note 14, at 180-81 (concluding after “canvassing the oppositional literature” that “the recurrent
and unavoidable leitmotif of disagreement with the PPACA is its alleged violation of liberty—and in
particular, economic liberty”).
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apply with equal force to the Massachusetts statute that mandates individual
possession of health insurance.28
Instead of arguing straightforwardly that all “individual mandates” to obtain
health insurance coverage violate substantive due process, opponents of the ACA
appear to be enlisting the emotional force of the liberty argument without actually
making it. On the one hand, they derive rhetorical power from the “just leave me
alone” liberty-inflected criticism of the minimum coverage provision. This criticism
has a certain common-sense appeal, particularly if one considers the matter only
from the perspective of the individual (as opposed to society), and if one ignores the
link between the provision and some very popular provisions of the ACA.29 These
provisions prohibit insurance companies from denying coverage based on preexisting conditions, canceling insurance absent fraud, charging higher premiums
based on medical history, and imposing lifetime limits on benefits.30 On the other
hand, opponents of the ACA do not in fact claim that substantive due process
protects a Lochner-style freedom from contract. Relying instead on the Commerce
Clause, they need not explicitly defend their appeal to individual liberty as a matter
of constitutional law.
III. LIBERTARIAN OBJECTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
The constitutional liberty argument is doctrinally hopeless. Because the
Supreme Court long ago abandoned freedom from contract as an independent limit
on government power,31 Lochner-style substantive due process challenges to the
minimum coverage provision have not survived motions to dismiss.32 No doubt
some who attack the provision on libertarian grounds believe that the Lochner Court
was right to defy the popular will for as long as it did,33 and wrong eventually to

28

M ASS. GEN . LAWS ch. 111M, § 2 (2008).
See Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health
Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 14–15 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/
2011/04/26/koppelman.html.
30
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg(a)(1), 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a), 300gg-11, 300gg-12 (West 2012)
(respectively prohibiting discriminatory premium rates, discrimination based on health status, preexisting condition exclusions, lifetime limits on the dollar value of benefits, and rescission except in
the case of fraud).
31
Compare, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (“The general right to make a
contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th
Amendment of the Federal Constitution . . . . The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty
protected by this amendment . . . .”), with W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937)
(“What is this freedom [of contract]? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”). See
also Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 244 (1998)
(“Lochner is never cited for its legal authority. Although it has never been formally overruled, it is
well understood among constitutional lawyers that relying on Lochner would be a pointless, if not a
self-destructive, endeavor.”).
32
See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d
1120, 1161-62 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (rejecting argument that “people have ‘recognized liberty interests in
the freedom to eschew entering into a contract’”).
33
See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. B ICKEL, THE LEAST D ANGEROUS B RANCH : THE SUPREME C OURT AT
THE B AR OF P OLITICS 45 (1962) (“Serving this value [of laissez-faire] in the most uncompromising
fashion, at a time when it was well past its heyday, five Justices, in a series of spectacular cases in the
1920’s and 1930’s, went to unprecedented lengths to thwart the majority will. The consequence was
very nearly the end of the story.”).
29
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abandon economic substantive due process under great duress.34 But few
constitutional critics of the minimum coverage provision publicly attack the
constitutionality of the Massachusetts mandate.
Moreover, even if the Court had not abandoned economic substantive due
process, an individual rights challenge to the minimum coverage provision might
still fail. Lochner-era jurisprudence itself recognized that the states’ police power
limits the realm of individual liberty in significant respects.35 For example, Charles
Fried has directed attention to the Court’s unanimous and still governing decision in
Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,36 which upheld a mandatory
vaccination law.37 Decided the same year as Lochner v. New York,38 Jacobson is
highly relevant to the question whether the minimum coverage provision violates
constitutional liberty. Purchasing health insurance or paying a yearly fee39 seems a
much less severe interference with personal liberty than submitting to a statemandated smallpox vaccination or paying a fine.40 Mandatory vaccination implicates
the constitutional right to bodily integrity, which triggers heightened judicial
scrutiny.41 Mandatory possession of insurance does not implicate this right.42 From
the standpoint of individual rights, there is a similarly enormous difference between
the mandatory purchase of a product and the mandatory consumption of that
product.43 The ACA does not require anyone even to use his health insurance
coverage, let alone ingest anything.

34

For a recent account of the political fight over President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “courtpacking” plan, see JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER : FRANKLIN R OOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT
(2010). See also B ARRY FRIEDMAN , THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE : HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME C OURT AND SHAPED THE M EANING OF THE C ONSTITUTION 3-8, 202, 214,
217-36 (2009).
35
See, e.g., Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation During the Progressive
Era: A Reevaluation, 72 J. AM . HIST . 63 (1985). Urofsky observes that “[r]ecent studies of the United
States Supreme Court have led to a revision of that institution’s image as a thoroughgoing enemy of
reform” during the Progressive Era. Id. He argues that such a revision is also warranted with respect
to state courts:
In surveying state court decisions prior to World War I involving the basic elements of
the Progressive program to protect workers—laws involving child labor, maximum
hours, employer liability, and workmen’s compensation—one finds that, with only a few
exceptions, state courts moved consistently toward approval of a wide range of reform
legislation. In attempting to enact their program, Progressives, although occasionally
delayed in the courts, were not blocked there.
Id. at 64. Urofsky suggests that “Lochner . . . ought to be seen as an aberration,” one that “had only a
limited impact on state courts.” Id. at 79.
36
The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (testimony of Charles Fried, Beneficial Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School).
37
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
38
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
39
For an argument that the ACA exaction for being uninsured is a tax for purposes of Congress’s
tax power, notwithstanding that Congress called it a “penalty,” see generally Cooter & Siegel, supra
note 8.
40
See Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11.
41
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing the right of a
competent adult to refuse unwanted medical treatment).
42
For a discussion of the right to bodily integrity, see Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits
that the Minimum Coverage Provision Respects, 27 C ONST . C OMMENT. 591, 599-601 (2011).
43
Cf. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1289
(N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d
1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603
(2011) (mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27,
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Notably, Mr. Jacobson, the petitioner in the aforementioned vaccination case,
was endangering not only himself, but others as well, by refusing to get vaccinated.
Moreover, he was free riding on the contributions to collective action of others who
submitted to vaccination: every person who received the vaccine made Mr. Jacobson
that much safer. The Court presumably had these facts in mind when it rejected Mr.
Jacobson’s insistence “that a compulsory vaccination law is unreasonable, arbitrary
and oppressive, and, therefore, hostile to the inherent right of every freeman to care
for his own body and health in such way as to him seems best.”44 Registering that
important interests of many others were at stake, the Court instead accepted the
government’s framing of the case, which stressed “[t]he good and welfare of the
Commonwealth,” the very “basis on which the police power rests in
Massachusetts.”45
IV. LIBERTARIAN OBJECTIONS AND POLITICAL MORALITY
Even putting aside substantive due process doctrine and considering political
morality, the argument that the minimum coverage provision violates individual
liberty faces a steep uphill battle. In view of the free-rider problems of
uncompensated care and adverse selection that undermine healthcare and health
insurance markets,46 it is difficult to establish that no government in America should
be able to require financially able individuals to obtain health insurance.
A. MARKETS AND MARKET FAILURES
People disagree in ideologically predictable ways about the appropriate size and
power of the government relative to other institutions, particularly the market. Those
who believe in limited government argue that, beyond military defense and police
protection, public goods are few in number. They also articulate a narrow
understanding of externalities and contend that markets are largely self-regulating.
By contrast, those who believe in robust government argue that public goods are
numerous, including education, research, poverty relief, the arts, and the
environment. They also articulate a broad understanding of externalities and
maintain that markets often fail without government regulation.
Despite their many disagreements, participants in such debates typically agree
that collective action problems can justify state intervention into the market. As
noted in the Introduction, one kind of collective action problem is a free-rider
problem. A free-rider problem, in turn, is a type of externality problem.47 And a
negative externality is one of the standard forms of market failure, one widely

2012), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012)
(“Congress could require that people buy and consume broccoli at regular intervals, not only because
the required purchases will positively impact interstate commerce, but also because people who eat
healthier tend to be healthier, and are thus more productive and put less of a strain on the health care
system.”).
44
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
45
Id. at 27.
46
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (discussing the cost shifting and adverse
selection problems).
47
In general, “externalities” refer to unpriced benefits and costs. They are external to the market.
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agreed to justify government regulation.48 Accordingly, an argument that no
government may impose an individual mandate to combat free riding, no matter how
effective it would be relative to the regulatory alternatives, would be hard to justify
under most accounts of what is included among the basic purposes of the
government, as opposed to the market.
Anyone wanting to make an individual rights argument to justify the
“inactivity” of free riders must face the long tradition of argument, formalized in
economics, that the government is properly granted the authority to solve collective
action problems because markets cannot.49 Just as it makes little sense to argue that
only the states may address problems that the states are separately incompetent to
address,50 so it makes little sense to argue that only markets may address problems
that markets are incompetent to address. Because markets cannot solve market
failures, it is not clear what the Tea Party activists who issued the “Contract from
America” have in mind when they call for replacing the ACA “with a system that
actually makes health care and health insurance more affordable by enabling a
competitive, open, and transparent free-market health care and health insurance
system that isn’t restricted by state boundaries.”51
To be sure, the cost-shifting and adverse selection problems targeted by the
minimum coverage provision are not classic market failures in that they are caused
in part by governments that mandate treatment in medical emergencies and prohibit
insurance companies from denying coverage to people for various reasons. As we
discuss in Part V, however, private behavior also plays a substantial role in causing
these problems. Many hospitals have long-standing charitable practices that require
stabilizing treatment in an emergency, and the problem of adverse selection in
insurance markets long predates the ACA.
B. MILL’S ANTI-P ATERNALISM PRINCIPLE
Turning from economics to philosophy, the question of what the state may and
may not legitimately require of individuals is the problem that John Stuart Mill
intended his “harm principle” to solve. Mill devoted one of the most important tracts
in political philosophy to defending the liberty of the individual from unwarranted
restriction. His subject in On Liberty was the “limit to the legitimate interference of
collective opinion with individual independence:” he sought to discern “how to
make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control.”52
In drawing the line, Mill focused on harms that individuals cause others. “The sole
end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection.”53
Specifically, Mill proposed the “harm principle” to limit the circumstances in
which society may interfere with an individual’s decision to do or not do as he or she
wishes. According to the “harm principle,” individual choice is properly curtailed in

48
The other standard forms of market failures are monopoly and asymmetric information. See,
e.g., R OBERT D. C OOTER, THE STRATEGIC C ONSTITUTION 105-08 (2000) (analyzing the technical
characteristics of goods that can cause markets to fail).
49
Id. at 105 (“Market failure provides the conventional economic justification for state supply
and regulation of goods.”).
50
See generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 5.
51
THE C ONTRACT FROM AMERICA, supra note 17.
52
M ILL, supra note 13, at 76.
53
Id. at 80. “His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.” Id.
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situations in which individuals act or decline to act in ways that cause harm to
important interests of others. “As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects
prejudicially the interests of others,” Mill wrote, “society has jurisdiction over it, and
the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering
with it, becomes open to discussion.”54
By the same token, Mill rejected paternalistic justifications for the exercise of
coercive power, which seek to prevent individuals from harming themselves.
“[T]here is no room for entertaining any such question when a person’s conduct
affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless
they like.”55 “In all such cases,” Mill concluded, “there should be perfect freedom,
legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.56
Mill’s harm principle is pertinent to evaluation of libertarian objections to the
minimum coverage provision for several reasons that go beyond or, better,
substantiate its canonical status. One is the principled radicalism of his libertarian
position. In Mill’s view, people owe nothing to others’ moral convictions about good
conduct, no matter how deep, widespread, or reasonable those convictions are.
Consistent application of his nineteenth-century doctrine would, for instance,
straightforwardly condemn the holding of Bowers v. Hardwick,57 upholding antisodomy laws on grounds of traditional moral condemnation, and embrace that of
Lawrence v. Texas,58 invalidating such a law as a violation of constitutionally
protected liberty. Mill’s doctrine would require acknowledging the liberty interest in
assisted suicide that the Court declined to find in Washington v. Glucksberg,59 and
invalidating bans on it unless the practice somehow harmed others in a material way.
Quite aside from the federalism question in Gonzales v. Raich,60 his principle would
require protection of medical marijuana use on grounds of personal liberty, at least if
the only objection to the practice were moral. Whether or not one likes all of these
conclusions, there is no denying that Mill’s position was genuinely and deeply
libertarian.
Mill is also relevant to the ACA debate because of his situation in the
development of modern ideas of freedom. He was motivated by the same antiauthoritarian spirit as many of today’s libertarians. He spent his life as a reformer of
a specific kind: one dedicated to stripping away arbitrary, unnecessary, and selfserving regulation of individuals. He stood between, and worked mightily to
combine, two great emancipating movements that sought to vindicate the primacy of
the individual. The first was utilitarianism, the doctrine and movement in which Mill
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Id. at 139.
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Id. Mill reiterated both parts of his distinction in part V:
The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in
so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. Advice, instruction,
persuasion, and avoidance by other people if thought necessary by them for their own
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interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or
to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its
protection.
Id. at 156.
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was raised by his father, the reformer James Mill, and by his father’s patron and
intellectual guide, Jeremy Bentham.61 Utilitarianism is often styled today as a school
with insufficient respect for the individual, partly because of the important and
influential arguments of John Rawls in A Theory of Justice.62 For nineteenth-century
reformers, though, utilitarianism was a weapon aimed at all laws that explicitly or
implicitly treated the interests of some—usually laborers or the middle class—as
less important than those of the wealthy and prominent. Its cardinal principle was
that each individual was to count for exactly the same as any other, and that the
many forms of legally enshrined privilege must give way to this moral equality. Mill
followed through on this principle in his abhorrence of sex discrimination and his
commitment to the moral and legal equality of women and men.63
The second great emancipation that actuated Mill was Romanticism, the
discovery—if that is the word—of the depth and intensity, the opacity and beauty, of
individual experience and identity. Romantics made these qualities their watchword,
and they came to form the other half of the younger Mill’s position—the necessary
counterpoint to his utilitarianism. “Necessary” seems the right term because Mill
himself famously concluded that even the total success of utilitarian reform would
leave life flat and dull, not even worth living, without this flame of passionate
individuality.64 On Liberty is a vindication of this value. Mill’s defense of liberty
rested on two basic ideas: that there were no good utilitarian grounds for regulating
self-regarding action, and that such regulation was horrible because it sought to
extinguish the qualities that gave life its worth.65
Mill’s motivation and historical situation highlight the integrity of his
libertarianism. Mill abhorred intrusion on individual freedom as much as he
abhorred anything, and for the same reasons as today’s libertarians. In On Liberty,
he was not engaged in some half-hearted enterprise along the lines of giving
individuality its due in the modern state. His commitment to personal freedom was
axiomatic and whole-hearted. For these reasons, it is significant that Mill’s
libertarianism does not imply a rejection of the ACA’s minimum coverage
provision, as we will show.
Nor, to be clear, does Mill’s harm principle, taken as a bare abstraction, imply
embrace of the minimum coverage provision. Rather, it explains how such questions
should be resolved. Mill contended that there was a large swath of questions about
the scope of personal liberty that could be decided only by reference to a prior
decision, grounded in law or social norms, about what members of a given polity
owed one another. These questions did not involve purely self-regarding behavior, as
to which only moral condemnation could furnish objections. Rather, these were
areas of practical interdependence where relevant externalities were defined in part
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See David Bromwich, A Note on the Life and Thought of John Stuart Mill, in ON LIBERTY,
supra note 13, at 1-5, 18-25 (on Mill’s relation to his father, the family’s bond with Bentham, and
Mill’s mature view of Bentham’s thought).
62
See JOHN R AWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27 (1971) (“Utilitarianism does not take seriously the
distinction among persons.”).
63
See generally JOHN STUART M ILL , THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (M.I.T. Press 1970) (1869).
See also Bromwich, supra note 61, at 7, 17-18 (discussing Mill’s view of sexual equality).
64
See Bromwich, supra note 61, at 5-10 (discussing Mill’s relation to Romanticism and his
conclusion that utilitarian achievement alone could not be reason to live).
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See M ILL, supra note 13, at 83 (“The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of
pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not deprive others of theirs, or impede their
efforts to obtain it.”).
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by legal or social definitions of interests and duties. Whether these externalities rose
to the level of justifying regulation was itself a social judgment that found
expression in law and norms. In contrast to his position on purely self-regarding
behavior, which gave him a vantage point outside law and convention from which to
assess law and convention, Mill accepted that there was no getting outside the web
of legal and other normative judgments—no sword to cut the Gordian knot—when
regulation addressed interdependence.
Mill got this right, and understanding his argument helps one to appreciate why
there is no decisive libertarian objection to the minimum coverage provision.
Instead, the debate unavoidably has recourse to a further argument about what we
owe one another—that is, how far social obligation can legitimately override
personal autonomy given the respective weight of these values in our system of law
and social morality. Federal laws that guarantee access to emergency care, similar
state statutes, and charitable hospital practices give us important information about
the state of that argument.66
The key to this aspect of Mill’s thought comes in a characteristically dense and
precise passage at the beginning of his discussion of “the limits to the authority of
society over the individual.”67 Here he defined the harm principle by reference to
“certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding,
ought to be considered as rights.”68 These are the interests that cannot be “harmed”
under the harm principle. In identifying the “line of conduct” that “each should be
bound to observe,” Mill argued for unrestricted personal autonomy in choosing selfregarding acts, that is, those where “a person’s conduct affects the interests of no
person besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like.”69 This is the area
of paternalism, which Mill rejected as a legitimate basis for regulation.
The zone of interdependence, by contrast, is the area where others’ interests are
in fact implicated in one’s action or inaction. It is here that “express legal provision”
and “tacit understanding” are necessary to distinguish between those interests of
others that one may legitimately burden by one’s actions and those interests in which
others are protected by regulation of one’s conduct. In this area, the content of a
libertarian principle is inseparable from legal and social judgments about the line
between personal liberty and social obligation.
Having set out Mill’s essential distinction between regulations based on
paternalism and those based on interdependence, we now examine more precisely
what his thinking suggests about the permissibility of the minimum coverage
provision. In theorizing the boundary between individual liberty and the general
welfare, Mill did not emphasize a distinction between action and inaction. “A person
may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction,” Mill wrote,
“and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury.”70 According to
Mill, the individual “may rightfully be compelled to perform . . . many positive acts
for the benefit of others.”71 For example, society may require a person “to give
evidence in a court of justice” and “to bear his fair share in the common defense or
in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the
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protection.”72 Similarly, in Mill’s usage, the term “conduct” included both “not
injuring the interests of one another” and “each person’s bearing his share (to be
fixed on some equitable principle) of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending
the society or its members from injury and molestation.”73 Likewise, in rejecting
paternalistic justifications for social compulsion, he wrote that the individual
“cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to
do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so
would be wise or even right.”74
This is quite consistent with the general cast of Mill’s thought. His concern is
with which kinds of interests can justify regulation of individuals, and who gets to
identify such interests. His commitment to liberty in no way depends on an abstract
contrast between action and non-action, let alone a privileging of non-action.
What, then, about government compulsion (or, more precisely, incentivizing)75
of financially able individuals who do not wish to obtain health insurance coverage?
To the extent that libertarian critics of the minimum coverage provision embrace
Mill’s harm principle, they must show that the provision is paternalistic legislation—
that going without insurance causes no significant harm to important interests of
others. This would be difficult to do. To the contrary, individual insurance coverage
falls squarely into the zone of interdependence where legal and social judgments
inevitably decide which interests qualify for libertarian protection, rather than into
the area of self-regarding actions where only paternalistic interests are present.
Financially able individuals who lack health insurance, whether their conduct is
characterized as “inactive” or “active,”76 cause significant harm to others’ interests
in several ways.77 They do so when they consume healthcare without paying for it,
thereby shifting costs to other actors in the interstate healthcare market. They harm
others’ interests when they raise health insurance premiums for everyone in the risk
pool by staying out of the pool, secure in the knowledge that they will have access to
expensive emergency care (made possible by the healthcare infrastructure) if they
are grievously injured or fall ill. They cause harm to others when they wait to obtain
health insurance coverage until they become sick, and then consume a
disproportionate share of healthcare services that must be paid for by healthier
individuals in the risk pool (who did not wait until they were sick to procure
insurance).78
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In all of these ways, a financially able individual’s decision to remain uninsured
harms the interests of those around her. Indeed, her decision burdens others’ liberty
interest in not funding her imprudence. As then-Governor Romney wrote in 2006,
defending his state’s decision to impose an insurance mandate, “Some of my
libertarian friends balk at what looks like an individual mandate. But remember,
someone has to pay for the health care that must, by law, be provided: Either the
individual pays or the taxpayers pay. A free ride on the government is not
libertarian.”79
In sum, Mill’s harm principle contains two branches: a categorical rejection of
paternalism as a basis for regulation and a conditional rejection—which is also,
perforce, a conditional embrace—of interdependence as a basis for legal compulsion
of individuals. There is no creditable basis for classifying the minimum coverage
provision as an instance of paternalism, rather than a legal and social judgment about
which interdependent interests justify regulation. Therefore, joining Mill in
categorically rejecting paternalism provides no libertarian warrant for a categorical
rejection of the minimum coverage provision.
To be clear, we are not arguing against paternalism as a justification for the
exercise of either federal or state regulatory power. Our point is more modest: even
if one rejects paternalism as providing sufficient cause to restrict individual liberty,
that commitment gives no basis for rejecting the minimum coverage provision in
light of the harms to others that the provision targets.
C. BUT WHY SHOULD AMERICANS CARE ABOUT MILL?
We have already offered two reasons why Mill’s harm principle is pertinent to
the present debate over the minimum coverage provision. First, his libertarianism
was heartfelt and rooted in both commitment to individuality and rejection of
paternalism. Second, his harm principle is a philosophical touchstone in the history
of libertarian thought.
One might nonetheless object that we are wrongly conflating libertarianism with
Mill, a long-ago and far-away subject of a foreign sovereign whose substantive
views on economic and social policy put him to the left of most contemporary
American libertarians. “What’s Mill to me?” today’s libertarian voter might ask.
There are additional reasons for looking to Mill. For one thing, the harm
principle captures with precision the basic libertarian formula: it holds that my
interests, projects, and commitments are my own to define, and are no concern of
yours unless and until they impinge on your symmetrical self-regarding concerns. In
other words, mind your own business and leave other people to theirs.

1057, 11-1058), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420) (citing
numerous studies finding that “[t]he decision of some uninsured individuals to put off regular
preventive care actually increases their activity in the health care market in the long run”). This last
harm, moreover, cannot be addressed fully through actuarially appropriate pricing of insurance
policies. This is because of the adverse selection problem that undermines the operation of health
insurance markets even absent the ACA’s prohibitions on the restrictive practices of insurance
companies. See Siegel, supra note 4 (observing that the market for health insurance attracts adverse
selection, even absent the ACA’s prohibitions on underwriting, because individuals know much more
about their health status than insurers do).
79
Mitt Romney, Health Care for Everyone? We Found a Way, WALL ST . J., Apr. 11, 2006, at
A16; see also id. (reporting that forty percent of the state’s uninsured population “were earning
enough to buy insurance but had chosen not to do so” because insurance “is expensive, and because
they know that if they become seriously ill, they will get free or subsidized treatment at the hospital”).
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For another thing, Mill addressed his argument specifically to the question that
animates the libertarian position in the debate over the ACA: the appropriate basis of
government regulation, rather than, for instance, the scope of moral reasons and
responsibility generally. Mill proposed operational—political and legal—
conceptions of freedom and harm, rather than general philosophical conceptions of
them.
In sum, we have offered four good reasons for libertarians to take Mill seriously.
Mill’s libertarianism is sincerely anti-authoritarian and freedom-protecting. It has
stood the test of time, achieving deserved canonical status. It captures libertarian
commitments in a clear and forceful way. And it addresses the question at issue in
the minimum coverage debate.
There is another, more conceptual reason for embracing the harm principle as an
appropriate libertarian standard against which to assess contemporary libertarian
objections to the minimum coverage provision. It is no quirk of Mill’s thinking that,
when paternalism is not at issue, he refers the line between personal autonomy and
legitimate regulation to the social morality of the specific time and place. In
conditions of practical interdependence, where many acts redound to the harm or
benefit of others, what it means to protect liberty is not self-evident as an abstract
matter. Any substantive conception of liberty requires both specification—the line
shall be there and not here—and some account of the reasons for placing it there,
which always means disregarding certain interdependent interests of others in order
to protect personal autonomy.
There are two ways to justify such a line: by appeal beyond social convention,
and by appeal to social convention. The first kind of appeal is to some principle that
is independent of the time and place where the argument happens, such as a religious
or natural-law foundation. Such reasons may be powerful for those who hold them.
No doubt many libertarians today believe that the moral and philosophical truth of
their commitments is independent of current social morality. But there is deep and
extensive disagreement over the basis and content of any such reasons and, indeed,
whether they exist at all. Absent some means of persuasion that can bridge these
gaps, we agree with John Rawls that appeals to these principles cannot count as
public reason-giving in the United States today.80
That leaves arguments over the content of libertarian freedom with just one line
of appeal: to contemporary social morality. To defend a specific version of
libertarianism as giving reasons that other citizens ought to respect, one cannot avoid
arguing that this libertarian vision best expresses the values of the political
community. Of course, one can adopt and advocate whatever version of
libertarianism one likes. But defending it as potentially authoritative for others
requires appeal to values that one holds in common with them, or at least to values
that the contending parties jointly recognize as central to a shared political culture.81
In short, we draw from Mill not because we (incorrectly) think that most libertarians
in America today subscribe to the harm principle, but because his libertarianism
directs attention to arguments that ought to count as public reason-giving in the
United States.
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Recall that these considerations apply not to all libertarianism, but to
libertarianism that asserts personal autonomy against social regulation outside the
domain of paternalism. The rejection of paternalistic bases for regulation is
categorical. We give libertarianism its due—indeed, we arguably give it more than
its due—by assuming for purposes of analysis that the minimum coverage provision
may not be defended on paternalistic grounds, notwithstanding instances of
paternalism in American law and life. Regardless, once practical interdependence is
present, others’ interests are implicated in one’s own actions, and the harm principle
can no longer be a razor to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate regulation.82
Instead, it must serve as a signpost, directing discussion to the content of social
morality.
V. CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MORALITY AND
REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES
Because many libertarians reject the minimum coverage provision despite its
status as non-paternalistic legislation,83 we now consider libertarian reasons for
doing so. We see two lines of libertarian argument for rejecting the provision even
though it does not fall afoul of Mill’s categorical anti-paternalism principle. First,
maybe the interests of others affected by an individual choice to forgo insurance are
not among those “which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding,
ought to be considered as rights.”84 Because Mill deliberately wrote at a high level of
abstraction at a time and place far removed from modern America, his principle
cannot answer the question of what contemporary Americans owe one another.85 He
is more useful in framing the problem of social harm than in resolving it. To resolve
the question, we must ask into the balance that law and social attitudes have placed
between autonomy and the inevitable burdens of interdependence. We think it
uncontroversial that contemporary social morality permits some solution to the
problems of cost-shifting and adverse selection in healthcare and health insurance
markets; ours is not a society in which people are generally entitled to impose
significant material harms on others, whether financial or otherwise. For example,
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Some have argued that, because we are all psychologically affected by knowledge of one
another’s conduct, much of what Mill seems to have regarded as self-regarding conduct in fact has
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federal and state quarantine authority strongly suggests otherwise.86 But granting this
much, some solutions to free-rider problems may be more consistent with social
morality than others.
Second, even if one accepts that free-rider problems justify regulation in this
area, there may be ways of addressing them that are less coercive than the minimum
coverage provision. This point departs from the letter of Mill’s thought, but in an
appropriate fashion. If one gives special status to liberty interests, as all libertarians
do, then it seems fitting to apply something like a “less restrictive means” test to the
social and legal debate over how far regulation is justified.
It is appropriate, then, to assess libertarian alternatives to the minimum coverage
provision as solutions to the cost-shifting and adverse selection problems. We do
this in two ways. First, we examine the alternatives’ fit with the duties to one
another established by law and social morality in the contemporary United States.
Second, we analyze their viability as alternative measures that would burden
individual liberty less than the minimum coverage provision does.
A. THE CONTENT OF AMERICAN SOCIAL MORALITY
Begin with the question of whether libertarian alternatives comport with social
morality. Denying emergency room care to uninsured individuals would solve the
cost-shifting problem without requiring anyone to obtain health insurance coverage.
This would represent a legal judgment that present social morality does not include
the principle that Americans owe one another medical care in times of immediate
and pressing need.
This alternative to the minimum coverage provision, however, does not seem
plausible from the standpoint of contemporary social morality. The national political
community has long been committed to providing stabilizing care to individuals
regardless of their ability to pay for this care or their insurance status. Federal law
requires hospitals that participate in Medicare and offer emergency services—in
other words, almost every hospital in America—to stabilize patients who go to their
emergency rooms during medical emergencies regardless of their ability to pay.87
State legislation and tort law impose similar requirements,88 as do most hospitals
themselves.89
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Judging from these laws and charitable practices, most Americans reject the
libertarian morality that would deny the uninsured stabilizing care in a medical
emergency. Ours is not a country that lets people die in the street just outside a
hospital entrance for lack of financial means or health insurance. Whatever might be
said about certain Republican primaries at this time, what serious candidate for
President would run on such a platform in a general election?
Another libertarian alternative would be to pursue any of several ways of
addressing the adverse selection problem in health insurance markets. For example,
Congress could have permitted insurance companies to continue their exclusionary
practices, rather than make the adverse selection problem worse by requiring the
companies to insure willing purchasers regardless of pre-existing conditions.90 These
ACA provisions, however, are as popular as the minimum coverage provision
appears unpopular.91 It therefore seems difficult to argue that libertarian objections
to these provisions capture the contemporary American ethos.92 The opposite seems
true. The popularity of these federal regulations—like the popularity of Social
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid—suggests the conclusion that most Americans are
not libertarian.
One might object that we misread American social morality. Specifically, one
might argue that, in light of the unpopularity of the minimum coverage provision as
determined by polling, contemporary morality is substantially more libertarian than
we acknowledge. We are not so sure.
First, the relevant poll questions are written in a loaded fashion. For example,
the AP-National Constitution Center Poll of August 2011 asked about the minimum
coverage provision in this way:
Do you think the Federal Government should have the power to
require all Americans to buy health insurance, and to pay a fine if they
don’t or do you think the Federal Government should not have that
power?93
The minimum coverage provision does not apply to “all Americans;” it includes
several exemptions, particularly for individuals in difficult financial circumstances.94
Moreover, labeling the exaction for going without insurance a “fine” sounds in
punishment; a more neutral approach would be to call the exaction for non-insurance
a “fee” or a “certain amount of money.” In addition, the poll question does not
identify the benefits that the minimum coverage provisions helps to make possible: a

90
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healthcare regime in which individuals and families cannot be denied coverage
based on pre-existing conditions.
Rather than asking Americans how they feel about being forced to do something
by the federal government or else being punished by the federal government, the poll
question might ask the following:
Do you support the federal government’s requiring you to choose
between obtaining a minimum level of health insurance or paying
roughly $700 each year, given that your choosing between these
options enables the federal government to prevent health insurance
companies from denying you coverage based on pre-existing
conditions and charging you higher premiums based on your medical
history?95
If Americans were asked that question, we suspect that the minimum coverage
provision would seem less unpopular.
Second, as mentioned above, other parts of the ACA are very popular,
suggesting that Americans may not understand the connection between the minimum
coverage provision and the parts of the law they like.96 Third, Americans may also
misunderstand the extent to which individuals who choose to remain uninsured end
up imposing costs on others, including themselves.97
Fourth, even if people had full information and still opposed the minimum
coverage provision, such a state of affairs would not necessarily be evidence of
libertarian commitments. It might equally well reflect an all-too-human desire to
want valuable things without having to pay for them.98 The minimum coverage
provision would likely be more popular if Congress amended the ACA to provide
that the exaction for going without insurance would be paid out of the proceeds of a
tax on individuals and corporations earning more than $1,000,000 per year. Such a
redistributive arrangement, however, hardly qualifies as libertarian.
All that said, we would be over-claiming if we asserted that American social
morality compels the minimum coverage provision. As advocates of “American
exceptionalism” accurately point out, American social morality is more libertarian
than that of many other democracies. But given (1) the long-standing political
legitimacy of Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, EMTALA, unemployment
insurance, and a variety of other safety net laws and programs, (2) the fact that the
ACA was enacted into law (which required sixty votes in the Senate), and (3) the
political origins of the minimum coverage provision in conservative political
thought,99 we conclude that the provision is defensible as a matter of contemporary
social morality. All these laws, like charitable hospital practices and federal and
state quarantine authority, impose non-trivial burdens on some of us in order to
make the lives of millions of potentially vulnerable Americans less insecure. A
different conclusion might be warranted if efforts to privatize Social Security and
Medicare were to succeed; if EMTALA and related state laws and charitable
practices did not exist, and if all provisions of the ACA were persistently unpopular.
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Debate over the content of American social morality is important evidence that
Mill properly treated libertarian objections to non-paternalistic regulation as a matter
of contextual convention rather than abstract principle. Such disagreement is not just
for or against personal liberty, but is more fundamentally about the content of
personal liberty as Americans understand and have understood it.100 The debate over
the ACA is a contest over both the interpretation of that liberty as it has existed until
now and the shaping of that liberty as it will be in the future. Social morality
changes. It has changed before, and it can change again. It is permissible for
opponents of the ACA to attempt such change, including by advocating for repeal of
the law. But the strong claim that present social morality condemns the minimum
coverage provision—that it is not within the realm of permissibility—is best
understood as a proposal to change the center of social morality in the United States,
not to invoke it. It is an attempt to move the goalposts, not to kick through them.
There is nothing fundamentally un-American about the minimum coverage
provision.
B. LESS LIBERTY-INFRINGING ALTERNATIVES?
Once Congress decided to end the exclusionary practices of insurance
companies, it could have tried alternatives to a purchase mandate that would have
infringed individual liberty less substantially. For example, Congress could have
provided higher subsidies to tempt healthier individuals into the insurance pool.101
Or it could have automatically enrolled individuals in insurance as a default but
allowed them to opt out if they did not want coverage.102 Congress also could have
imposed limited open-enrollment periods and penalties for late enrollment.103
Each of these alternatives is problematic for one reason or another. Congress
can always elect to spend more money on a problem, which requires either tax
increases or deficit spending. Spending more taxpayer money does not seem
obviously preferable from a libertarian perspective.
The other alternatives to the minimum coverage provision mentioned above
(auto-enrollment as a default and limited open-enrollment periods with penalties for
late enrollment) are unlikely to be as effective.104 The President embraced the
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minimum coverage provision only after the internal modeling of his top aides
“showed that a mandate would extend coverage to 32 million uninsured people.
Without such a requirement, . . . the administration estimated it could cover 16
million people at three-fourths the costs of covering the 32 million.”105 There do not
appear to be alternatives to the minimum coverage provision that would be about as
effective and less coercive.106 To our knowledge, critics of the minimum coverage
provision have not identified any.
Of course, a government-run, single-payer system of national healthcare would
be at least as effective as the minimum coverage provision. But the single-payer
system is also arguably more coercive in its restriction of market-mediated
individual decisions. The ACA preserves private health insurance markets and
allows individuals to choose among various health insurance options. If there are
libertarians who prefer a single-payer system on the ground that it would be a lesser
burden on individual freedom, we invite them to come forward. The case might be
made, but almost certainly not on the negative-liberty basis that founds
contemporary libertarianism in the United States.
Moreover, arguing over alternatives involves the libertarian position in
contradiction and compounding difficulties. It makes little sense to object to the
minimum coverage provision on libertarian grounds but to accept a regime of
Medicare for all on libertarian grounds. And if one rejects Medicare for all on
libertarian grounds, then one seems committed to rejecting Medicare as it now
stands and other federal programs that constitute the social safety net. The more
consistent the libertarian position, the less politically plausible it becomes.
To sum up our discussion of libertarian alternatives to the minimum coverage
provision, the most straightforward libertarian solution to the cost-shifting
problem—end universal access to emergency care—is not based on a plausible
reading of the state of duties in contemporary American law and social morality. In
addition, the most straightforward libertarian solution to the adverse selection
problem that the ACA itself causes—allow insurance companies to exclude
people—would be very unpopular. Finally, less coercive alternatives to the
minimum coverage provision would be either objectionable on libertarian grounds or
less effective in combating adverse selection.
C. A FINAL OBJECTION
One might nonetheless reject all of the above on the ground that government
may not regulate so as to solve problems that government itself plays a role in
creating.107 Cost-shifting arises not just from the behavior of the uninsured, but from
laws such as EMTALA. Adverse selection arises not just from imperfect information
in insurance markets but from the ACA provisions that require coverage regardless
of pre-existing conditions. May government contribute to the very problem that it
then asserts the power to solve? Does it offend American social morality for
government to create an unintended incentive to harm others while pursuing worthy
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objectives, and then to invoke that harm as justification for further infringing
individual liberty? The answer must be “no” as long as the initial law that created
the perverse incentive was itself justified by social morality. In law as in medicine,
socially beneficial interventions often have unfortunate side effects. Given this
unavoidable fact of living in an imperfect world, government may both make the
intervention and ameliorate the side effects. There is no neutral baseline independent
of pre-existing law against which to measure the permissibility of a government
regulation. So much new law presupposes the existence of older law that a contrary
conclusion would radically shrink the scope of government power in America,
thereby earning the condemnation of social morality.108
Even accepting the bootstrapping objection for purposes of argument, the
minimum coverage provision still ameliorates harms that individuals impose on
others and that government regulations play no role in causing: the adverse selection
problem in insurance markets that long pre-dated the ACA. The market for health
insurance attracts adverse selection, even absent the ACA’s prohibitions on
underwriting, because individuals know much more about their health status than
insurance companies do.109 This information asymmetry creates an incentive for
individuals to free ride by entering the market only when they expect to require
expensive medical care. In other words, the problem cannot be solved only through
actuarially appropriate pricing of insurance policies because insurance companies do
not possess enough information to price policies appropriately.110
The minimum coverage provision is an effective solution to this problem. It
prevents people from waiting to purchase insurance until they already suffer from
health problems, thereby free riding on individuals who purchased insurance while
they were healthy. Libertarians do not appear to have a persuasive answer to the
question of how markets can solve this market failure.
***
The principle of individual liberty that Mill enduringly articulated cannot
undergird a decisive libertarian objection to the minimum coverage provision.
Instead, Mill’s own libertarian formulation directs us to an inevitable higher-level
debate about which burdens of practical interdependence justify legal regulation of
individuals. In assessing that debate, Mill draws our attention to existing legal
designations of protected interests as evidence of the state of our social morality, and
to the more disputable “tacit judgments” of that morality itself. Existing law and
social practices suggest that the minimum coverage provision is consistent with
American social morality.
The libertarian argument against the provision is couched as an appeal to an
objective principle of liberty, but upon examination it is more a proposal to depart
from presently established ideas about what we owe one another as Americans. We

108
For a refutation of the bootstrapping objection from the perspective of constitutional law, see
Siegel, supra note 4, and Stuart M. Benjamin, Bootstrapping, 75 LAW & C ONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming 2012).
109
See C HARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH E CONOMICS 318 (4th ed. 2010) (noting the “risk . . . that
insurance companies will put an insurance plan into the market that uses one set of actuarial
projections about the costs of insured people but ends up attracting a special subset of the population
with unusually high health care costs”).
110
See supra note 78 (discussing the point that the adverse selection problem cannot be solved
through pricing alone).

396

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 38 NO. 2&3 2012

believe that proposal is inhumane, but that is an argument for another day. For the
moment, it is enough to say that the burden of persuasion lies with the libertarian
objector, and that such persuasion must appeal to legal arrangements and social
practices. The terms of persuasion cannot be an appeal to a freedom-protecting, antiregulatory trump card that misdescribes American society as it has developed since
at least the economic and constitutional crises of the Great Depression and the New
Deal.111
VI. CONCLUSION
This analysis suggests that proper resolution of the Commerce Clause question
in the constitutional debate over the ACA is conceptually connected to proper
resolution of the individual rights question. Just as the interstate scope of the
problems of cost-shifting and adverse selection justifies federal power to require
individuals to obtain health insurance coverage, so the existence of these free-rider
problems illuminates the difficulties with recognizing individual rights claims that
sound in liberty. To be sure, American constitutional law and culture recognize, or
decline to recognize, assertions of individual rights for a richly over-determined,
historically contingent, and right-specific set of reasons. But it is difficult to come
up with many instances in which legally competent and financially able individuals
are deemed to possess a right—whether as a matter of constitutional law or political
morality—to obtain the benefits of collective action without in any way contributing
to it.
Everyone agrees, however reluctantly, that the minimum coverage provision
does not violate substantive due process. The provision is also defensible as a matter
of contemporary social morality. In helping to address two significant sources of
harm to others, the provision does not run afoul of Mill’s anti-paternalism principle.
And in internalizing the externalities that individuals generate by forgoing health
insurance for the time being, the minimum coverage provision falls within the range
of what the contemporary national ethos suggests that Americans may legitimately
demand of one another.
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